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YOFI TIROSH

This Article offers three critical observations concerning the
debates surrounding paternalism in public health. First, the
assessment of paternalistic health-promoting policies stops at
efficacy considerations and fails to consider the possibility that such
policies may infringe basic rights. Second, discussions on health
and paternalism are not sufficiently context-specific, as they tend to
classify policies according to their degree of paternalism rather than
according to the often unique characteristics of each risky behavior.
And third, debates on public health and paternalism fail to address
background structural conditions that may change our
understanding of whether paternalistic means are at all needed.

1795

ARTICLE CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................... 1797
II. THE HARMS THAT THE DEBATE IGNORES ....................................... 1801
III. THE PROBLEMATIC FRAMING OF PATERNALISM DEBATES ...... 1805
IV. IT’S THE STRUCTURE, STUPID! .......................................................... 1810
A. BACKGROUND CONDITIONS MATTER ................................................ 1811
B. CONSIDERING WHAT REGULATORS DO NOT DO ................................ 1812
C. COMPLICATING THE UTILITY CALCULUS ........................................... 1813
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1814

Three Comments on Paternalism in Public Health
YOFI TIROSH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Friedman’s article offers an extremely effective typology of
the various “flavors” of paternalism aimed at helping individuals make
better decisions to promote their health and reduce general health care
costs.1 Friedman dedicates most of his analytical attention to paternalistic
policies targeting obesity, but his comparative discussion includes such
other public health issues as marijuana, water fluoridation, and GMO
labeling.2 Friedman helpfully classifies paternalism on a spectrum of
growing intervention, ranging from encouraging voluntarism (e.g.,
influencing food producers to commit to reducing the caloric value of their
products),3 through using soft means or “nudges” such as labeling,4 to hard
paternalistic policies such as bans or mandates (e.g., a marijuana ban or a
mandate for manufacturers to exclude lead as a paint ingredient).5 Every
paternalistic policy is assessed according to its potential to effectively
promote health and its potential to attain public approval. Designing and
introducing any paternalistic policy, Friedman argues, involves a delicate
balancing act between effectiveness and public support: more intrusive
policies oftentimes may be more effective but less tolerated by the public.6
Through this rich study of various paternalistic instruments used by
regulators in different fields, Friedman concludes that there are signs that
the American public has recently become less tolerant of interferences with
autonomy, and “the momentum seems to be veering against hard
paternalism.”7 The public’s objection to former New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg’s soda size limitation is strongly indicative of the low

*
Assistant Professor, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law. I am grateful to Amy Cohen, Ronit
Donyets Kedar, Kevin Kolben, and Zohar Kohavi for commenting on earlier versions of this text.
1
David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, 46 CONN. L.
REV. 1687, Part II.A (2014).
2
Id. Part III.B–C.
3
Id. at 1722.
4
Id. at 1729–34.
5
Id. at 1707–08.
6
See id. at 1770 (“An integrated response that accounts for the potential to improve public health
along with the popular tolerance or appetite for regulatory interventions will produce the best possible
social outcomes.”).
7
Id. at 1762.

1798

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1795
8

tolerance for paternalistic regulations that reduce autonomy. The growing
support for de-criminalizing marijuana and for GMO labeling, coupled
with the growing objection to water fluoridation, also contributes to the
conclusion that the current public atmosphere is one reflecting a “rejection
of paternalism.”9 This recent public rejection of limitations placed on
autonomy, Friedman warns, is a dynamic that “portends ills for the future
use of regulatory tools, soft and hard.”10 Friedman is quick to add that this
public suspicion is a reason for policymakers to avoid introducing overtly
paternalistic policies to promote public health.11 However, the public’s
diminished susceptibility to paternalism requires more caution and care in
designing policies. One strategy, Friedman suggests, is for policymakers
to hide the infringement of autonomy in their proposed regulations (as was
done in the trans fat ban)12 because “[t]he forgone autonomy is invisible or
simply has no value.”13 Friedman also recommends that policymakers use
narrative strategies that string data together into truthful and concrete
accounts of the harm that certain behaviors cause to health.14 This is
strong-form debiasing in Friedman’s typology, but since it is still a weaker
instrument than mandates or bans, Friedman urges using it more.15
One of the strengths of Friedman’s article is that it is written in the
spirit of humbleness. Friedman constantly stresses that policies, however
well-meaning, can have unintended and unanticipated consequences: “Too
much disclosure might distort risk assessment. Consumers may misapply
information or develop false confidence from having it. . . . If disclosure
unduly pushes consumers to eschew more sugar, for example, which leads
to consumption of more salt, the net effect might not be desirable.”16 Add
caloric information to menus, and you may find that caloric intake
increases rather than decreases.17 Teach Americans to reduce their fat

8
Id. at 1706; see also Kara Marcello, Note, The New York City Sugar-Sweetened Beverage
Portion Cap Rule: Lawfully Regulating Public Enemy Number One in the Obesity Epidemic, 46 CONN.
L. REV. 807, 851 & n.320 (2013) (noting that six out of ten New York City residents opposed the
regulation prior to its passage and that 450,000 residents signed a petition opposing the ban once it
passed).
9
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1765.
10
Id.
11
See id. at 1769 (arguing that regulators should “minimize the perception” that they are reducing
autonomy).
12
See id. at 1750 (“The trans fats ban proved less tangible, possibly because consumers did not
notice that it was missing.”).
13
Id. at 1709.
14
Id. at 1734–37.
15
See id. at 1737 (noting that “it may behoove regulators to invest more in uncovering the raw
cognitive science and in finding avenues to deploy these” narrative regulatory measures).
16
Id. at 1702–03 (footnote omitted).
17
See id. at 1731 (noting a survey’s findings that disclosing calories slightly increased caloric
intake).
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consumption, and they may disregard the amount of sugar in their food.
My comments evince my aim to continue in this spirit of humbleness
and awareness of unintended consequences and unnoticed challenges in
considering paternalistic policy means.
I will offer three critical
observations about the discussions on paternalism in public health.
First, while it is surely essential to typify and assess the different
degrees of paternalistic policies by their public support and success in
shaping behavior, assessments of paternalistic policies cannot stop there.
An evaluation of paternalistic health policies must include an assessment
of their legitimacy, whether viewed as an aspect of utility (i.e., the social
cost of infringement of the rights of liberties), or as a separate,
deontological consideration. By beginning his examination of paternalistic
policies with their level of effectiveness and public support, Friedman
neglects first-order questions about the theory of rights that justify
paternalistic policies.19 Through the lens of obesity-related policies, Part II
of this Article grapples with some of those first-order questions and argues
that a rights-centered assessment may reveal problems and raise questions
that are not addressed by an efficacy-centered analysis.
Second, discussions about paternalism should be issue-specific.
Instead, discussions about paternalism are typically general and move
between contexts. For example, labeling regarding the respective risks of
GMOs and tobacco are often examined under one umbrella, horizontally
cutting across different issues to draw comparisons between paternalistic
means. This horizontal methodology misses the particular characteristics
of each issue that would be unveiled if they were examined alone. Such
review would also enable realizing that each behavior the government may
want to prevent invokes different intuitions, as well as emotional
responses, moral and sometimes moralistic views, and cultural convictions.
One’s principled standpoint about paternalism—if one holds such a stance
at all—does not necessarily imply that one would have identical positions
about labeling GMOs and fluoridating water. For example, many people
may oppose governmental paternalism regarding marijuana but support
18
See Low Fat Foods Could Contain More Sugar than Standard Versions, Study Finds,
HUFFINGTON POST UK (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/09/20/calorie-andsugar-warning_n_1899366.html (citing a study that finds that some low-fat foods contain more sugar
than standard versions); see also Melinda Wenner Moyer, Carbs Against Cardio: More Data that
Refined Carbohydrates, Not Fats, Threaten the Heart, SCI. AM., May 2010, at 19 (“Processed
carbohydrates, which many Americans eat today in place of fat, may increase the risk of obesity,
diabetes and heart disease more than fat does . . . .”).
19
Rights-centered considerations are mentioned in passing in Friedman’s article but they are not
the core lens for review. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1, at 1737 (noting that long and dramatic
narratives may be too intrusive or even unlawful if imposed on the public); id. at 1752 (discussing
Mayor Bloomberg’s musings about the normative aspects of forcing people to exercise); id. at 1769
(mentioning that it would be morally inappropriate for policymakers to give up on attempts to regulate
to promote public health).
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government intervention in banning trans fats.
The debate is not
necessarily divided neatly along the lines of the acceptable limits of
paternalism, but rather is divided according to positions on the specific
issue. These positions are often deep and intuitive, and not always
derivable or justifiable on principled grounds pertaining to paternalism.
People may, for example, hold “back to nature” and anti-pharmaceutical
standpoints, leading them to advocate marijuana legalization and support
GMO labeling at the same time. Examining those issues together through
the lens of paternalism might create a false impression that the discussion
is unaffected by strong convictions, intuitions, or value systems; that it is
not always rational; and that it is sometimes tainted with moralistic
sentiments and cultural biases about specific topics. Therefore, any
discussion of paternalistic policies must be completed by a separate, issuesensitive analysis. Part III demonstrates this point by highlighting the
deep-rooted positions about obesity—positions that remain hidden in a
horizontal review of paternalism across multiple issues. It explains why
the strong moralistic positions at play in the obesity debate should be
factored into the design of policies aimed at reducing obesity.
Third, debates about paternalism often neglect issues of structure, such
as economic, legal, technological, social, and physical conditions that
shape health-risking behaviors. Structural changes sometimes turn a
previously harmless behavior into a risky behavior. For example, shopping
for vegetables used to be a low-risk behavior, but the prominence of
chemicals in agricultural usage has heightened the health risks surrounding
food and has made it harder to shop for pesticide-free vegetables.21 Part IV
stresses the need to incorporate the background environment into
paternalism debates and points to three problems regarding the neglect of
structure in these debates. First, background conditions often determine
whether there is a need for paternalistic policies. For example, the need for
a rule mandating safety belts arguably changes according to the availability
of public transportation, road quality, and tort rules that allocate
responsibility to different parties in an accident. Second, paternalism
debates often focus on what regulators do to promote health, but ignore
what regulators do not do to promote health. For instance, regulators can
20
See William J. Bennett & Christopher Beach, What Are They Smoking?, POLITICO
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/marijuana-liberal-hypocrisy102489.html#.U02oX-ZdVbt (“The national debate over marijuana legalization has caught many
liberals in a confounding paradox. These liberals, who have fought vociferously for bans on cigarettes,
super-sized sodas, trans fats and other unhealthy substances, now either advocate for the legalization of
marijuana or stand unopposed to it.”).
21
See Danielle Dellorto, ‘Dirty Dozen’ Produce Carries More Pesticide Residue, Group Says,
CNN (June 1, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/06/01/dirty.dozen.produce.pesticide/
(reporting on the use of pesticides in non-organic produce and discussing the potential harm of
pesticide consumption).
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mandate that restaurants indicate the caloric value of their food, while at
the same time permitting aggressive advertisement to children. These
types of omissions should also be taken into account when assessing
health-promoting paternalism. Third, changes in legal, technological, or
economic structure may render paternalistic means unnecessary or change
our evaluation of such means. In sum, background conditions may
determine whether a paternalistic policy is indeed paternalistic, or whether
it is needed at all.
Indeed, as Friedman recognizes, any paternalistic public health policy
infringes on autonomy to some degree.23 We differ, however, in
recognizing when autonomy is infringed. As I explain below, policies that
Friedman may consider mundane are problematic to me because my
understanding of autonomy includes a rich understanding of the
embodiment and significance of food and eating. We also differ on why
autonomy is a central issue. Friedman focuses on the public’s appreciation
of autonomy and explains that “[t]he measure of a given ban or mandate’s
sustainability would be the level of public toleration for the autonomy
loss.”24 But policies that infringe upon autonomy are problematic not
mainly because of the difficulty in marketing them to the public, but
because they are wrong in principle. Autonomy, in other words, is a much
heftier value than the weight it receives in Friedman’s discussion.
As mentioned above, I will focus on the example of obesity-prevention
policies to illustrate my critique. In my earlier work on this topic, I argued
that body size should be recognized as a domain of liberty and autonomy,
similar to religious practice or political speech.25 Moreover, I maintained
that the best way to promote public health is to foster an environment
which is free from the stigma of being fat26 and leaves room for everybody,
size notwithstanding.27
II. THE HARMS THAT THE DEBATE IGNORES
Friedman explores the limits of paternalism through two factors: the
22
See N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50(a)–(c) (2013) (mandating that chain
restaurants display the caloric content of their food and beverages).
23
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1701 (noting that even in instances where consumers are
“slightly nudged toward [their] choice,” autonomy is still “slightly reduced”).
24
Id. at 1707.
25
See generally Yofi Tirosh, The Right to Be Fat, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 264
(2012) (discussing the right to be of any body size).
26
I use the term “fat” and not “overweight” or “obese” deliberately. “Fat” is used in the emerging
field of fat studies and by advocates of affirmative approaches to large bodies. Moreover, terms such
as “overweight” and “obese” reflect the medical monopoly on the understanding of such bodies. For a
more elaborate discussion, see id. at 270 n.11.
27
Arguably, anorexia nervosa presents a challenge to this overarching acceptance of every body
size. For my initial take on anorexia nervosa, see id. at 318–19 n.221.
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effectiveness of a paternalistic policy and the corresponding level of public
approval or impatience with the paternalistic means.28 While these are
important factors, a significant third factor is missing: the justification (or
lack thereof) for the paternalistic policy in terms of rights. Some public
policies may be effective and approved by the public, but still unjust in
non-utilitarian terms.29
The questions surrounding anti-obesity policies not only require
consideration of whether the policies would promote general welfare30 and
find approval across the general public, but also whether they would
violate basic rights. Consider prominent legal scholar James J. White’s
recent suggestion overweight and obese people should pay more taxes on
calorie-dense foods.31 According to White, a customer at a supermarket or
restaurant would have to present a “not-fat card”32—an annually-issued
card on which one’s Body Mass Index (BMI) is recorded—to avoid the fat
tax.33 This tax would thus make fat people internalize the externalities they
impose on the thin.34 White argues that the tax would separate “the fat
from the thin,”35 both financially and socially, by stigmatizing the former.36
He explains that humiliating fat people “is an inevitable part” of this
scheme.37 Essentially, by adding a “platypygous tax” into the calculation,
White advocates public shamings in front of supermarket checkout lines
28

See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1692–93 (“Public attitudes toward paternalism can be . . .
inconsistent. Positing that paternalism has reached its limits can be challenging to prove or disprove,
but nowhere has the debate about paternalism been sharper than in public health. Though I focus on
various components of the obesity problem and other public health issues, I have composed this
narrative to show that paternalism may have reached the natural limits of effectiveness.”).
29
See, e.g., James J. White, Taxing the Platypygous, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 975, 989 (2013)
(“There are many possible objections to any tax that applies to some foods but not to others, and an
even larger number to discrimination between fat people and thin ones. Some of these objections are
prompted by sympathy for the fat: some will find it morally repugnant to direct more scorn at those
already afflicted with the social stigma against the obese. Others may object out of doubt about the
efficacy of the tax, about the cost of its application, or from doubt concerning the externalities.”).
30
Public welfare often decreases if basic rights are violated. That is, infringement of basic rights
may reduce happiness and decrease welfare. Thus, rights violations should, of course, be incorporated
into the utility calculus. In what follows, I will delineate rights infringement as normative or
deontological considerations and discuss them separately from utility. But, it is possible to frame the
debate within utilitarian considerations and still arrive at the same conclusion.
31
White, supra note 29, at 977.
32
Id. at 983.
33
Id. at 978–79.
34
See id. at 979 (providing three “virtues” the tax addresses); see also Friedman, supra note 1, at
1700–01 (“Market enthusiasts might endorse an externality-related tax, not for the primary purpose of
displacing personal choice, but to ensure that an actor’s choice is not distorted by making behavior less
expensive to the actor than it would be if internalized. In other words, if the tax internalizes the
externality of the behavior, balance would be restored to the market.”).
35
White, supra note 29, at 980.
36
See id. at 979 (“[T]his monetary tax can be expected to have a more powerful impact than a
conventional Pigovian tax, because it will stigmatize the overweight and obese . . . .”).
37
Id. at 983.
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and at restaurant dinner tables.
Even if a fat tax drew high public approval and effectively promoted
health, it would be morally and legally unjustifiable. In legal terms, such a
policy should be declared unconstitutional because it would infringe on
individual dignity, privacy, and autonomy. White’s calculus does not
incorporate the social cost of rights infringement, for under his proposed
model the government would monitor one’s BMI and subject a citizen’s
body to its gaze. Moreover, under his proposal, one-third of the population
(thin people) would regularly humiliate the remaining two-thirds (fat
people).39
Rights protection should be considered, however, even if overall utility
would not be affected by whether rights are violated. One should also ask
whether a society in which most members undergo ongoing humiliation is
a society that cares about its members’ welfare, even minimally.40 In other
words, taxing the fat may promote some aspects of health, but it would
likely harm other, no less important aspects of well-being—such as living a
life free of repeated humiliation and the infringement of basic rights.
Examining obesity prevention techniques through a normative
perspective, which takes into account not only efficacy but principled
legitimacy, may lead to the conclusion that despite their efficacy, certain
techniques are illegitimate. A recent case from Israel serves as an
example. JCDecaux Israel, a company that rents out street signs to
advertisers, donates its sign space for a few weeks every year to a
campaign to promote a public cause (such as encouraging the adoption of
abandoned pets).41 JCDecaux invites advertising agencies to design pro
bono posters for each year’s cause.42 This year, the campaign was
dedicated to raising awareness of child obesity,43 as childhood obesity rates
are high and increasing rapidly.44 In December 2013, street posters carried
38
Id. White adds, “Of course, the humiliation can be more pointed—suppose the checkout clerk
asks if the patron left his card at home, eliciting a second response that amounts to an admission that he
is overweight.” Id.
39
In 2010, about seventy percent of the U.S. population was defined as overweight or obese.
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED
STATES, 2012: WITH SPECIAL FEATURE ON EMERGENCY CARE 205 tbl.63 (2013), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus12.pdf#063.
40
White concludes his article by saying, “To those who think the tax too harsh, I say, consider the
scorn that we happily inflict on smokers. The platypygous deserve no better.” White, supra note 29, at
997.
41
Itamar Sharon, Agency Pulls “Fat-Shaming” Child Obesity Awareness Ads, TIMES ISR. (Jan. 9,
2014), http://www.timesofisrael.com/agency-pulls-fat-shaming-child-obesity-awareness-ads/.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
According to a 2010 OECD report, twenty-six percent of Israel’s children were designated as
overweight—which was the eleventh-highest figure out of thirty-three countries. OECD, OBESITY AND
THE ECONOMICS OF PREVENTION: FIT NOT FAT 7 (2010); Sarit Rosenblum, Report: Child Obesity High
in Israel, YNETNEWS.COM (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
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such slogans as, “When your child gains weight, his smile becomes
smaller,”45 or “One in every four teenage girls does not like to go shopping
due to weight problems.”46 Another poster presented an image of a fat kid
sitting on a seesaw with three kids on the other side.47 Finally, another
poster printed the word “DIET” in large type case and emphasized the
letters “DIE,” with the caption saying, “Children who suffer from being
overweight have only two options.”48
This campaign quickly drew extensive public criticism. Op-ed
columnists, parents, pediatricians, bloggers, social network users, and even
a children’s rights NGO expressed shock and repulsion over the
humiliation of children and the fact that this campaign stigmatized and
isolated fat kids and lacked empathy.49 After a few days, the posters were
removed and replaced by a still-moralistic and patronizing sign declaring
in rounded, bold font: “[N]ow that the posters have come down, it remains
in your hands alone.”50
Now, imagine that no one criticized this campaign. After all, this is a
plausible scenario, as many fat people and parents of fat children
internalize the shame and the denouncement of their bodies and feel that
judgment against them is justified.51 Even if those hurt by the campaign
said nothing, we should still denounce it on principled grounds, as it fosters
stigma and discrimination against fat individuals and infringes on their
basic welfare and dignity as humans.52
3964014,00.html. The 2013 statistics almanac entitled Children in Israel, presented in December 2013
by the National Council for the Child, found that “[a]mong first through ninth graders, 27.3 percent are
overweight, with Arabs and non-Haredi Jewish children more likely to be overweight than Bedouin or
Haredi children.” Yarden Skop, In Israel, Child Poverty, Abuse, Obesity, Idleness Rise, Study Finds,
HAARETZ (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.566103; see also NAT’L
COUNCIL FOR THE CHILD, CHILDREN IN ISRAEL: 2013 (2013) (English translation).
45
Nati Tucker, JCDecaux Israel Pulls Ad that Allegedly Insulted Overweight Children, HAARETZ
(Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.haaretz.com/business/.premium-1.568030.
46
See [Roy Farbstein, Great: 40 Signs of Creative Competition “Preventing Obesity in
Children”], PITRIA.COM (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.pitria.com/jsdecaux-competition (English
translation) (providing some of the “best ads” submitted to the competition).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See, e.g., [Avi Yofe, Pediatric Association: “Take Down the Appalling Campaign”], NRG
(Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/538/572.html (English translation) (describing the
public outrage over the obesity campaign posters). Some responses this author observed were
sarcastic, such as the following: “One in every four children suffers from the stupidity of advertisers,”
or “One in every four children knows your campaign sucks,” or pointing out that advertisers have a
vested interest in pointing to the damage to shopping, because they depend on consumption for their
livelihood.
50
Tucker, supra note 45.
51
This, I hypothesized, is a central reason why fat people do not sue for weight-based
discrimination even in jurisdictions in which such a suit is possible. See Tirosh, supra note 25, at 332
(noting a dearth of litigation pertaining to weight-based discrimination).
52
Such a campaign is bound to be ineffective as well, as research indicates that blaming and
shaming does not prompt fat people to lose weight, but causes exactly the contrary result. See infra
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Professor Maureen Arrigo-Ward powerfully articulated this point
almost two decades ago: “Try to imagine anything more invasive of
personal liberty than legislation or judicial decisions mandating the size of
one’s body and what one chooses to put into that body to nourish or
comfort it. . . . [T]hese choices should be deemed private and beyond the
realm of governmental intrusion.”53
III. THE PROBLEMATIC FRAMING OF PATERNALISM DEBATES
Juxtaposing soft and hard paternalistic regulatory means in the areas of
marijuana, obesity, and fluoridation, as Friedman does,54 misses the
particular nature of each risky behavior. Regulating food and eating habits
presents different challenges than regulating marijuana or GMO labeling,
and such regulation merits its own separate discussion. Indeed, this
“horizontal” method enables a comparative perspective on the legitimacy
and effectiveness of varying degrees of paternalism, but, as Friedman
himself recognizes, the behaviors that contribute to obesity are much more
complex and multi-dimensional than the behaviors involved in smoking or
in not wearing helmets when riding a motorcycle.55
This heightened complexity is not only relevant for designing an
effective policy, but is also relevant because anti-obesity paternalism would
be more invasive and infringe upon dignity. A more robust understanding
of the meaning and phenomenology of food, eating, and embodiment, as I
develop in my scholarship,56 would help recognize that eating and
exercising practices, which paternalistic policies wish to shape, are core
aspects of dignity and autonomy.57 Moreover, body size itself is a matter
of selfhood. The size of our body is an extremely important part of our
identity and personhood. It defines the texture of our skin, the pace of our
breath and our walk, and many other sensory experiences that are
immensely hard to articulate and conceptualize. The size of our body is
text accompanying notes 91, 93 (noting two studies’ findings that people responded to negative
messages about their weight by either eating more snacks or refusing to diet).
53
Maureen J. Arrigo-Ward, No Trifling Matter: How the Legal System Supports Persecution of
the Obese, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 27, 62 (1995).
54
Friedman, supra note 1, at Part III.B–C.
55
See, e.g., id. at 1710–11 (acknowledging that “obesity presents perhaps the biggest and most
complex public health challenge facing regulators” due to “complexities and controversies from
medical, epidemiological, and regulatory perspectives”).
56
See Tirosh, supra note 25, at 306, 309–10 (expounding on the idea that food, eating, and
embodiment are reflections of who we are as humans and how we live our lives in the everyday world);
see also Yofi Tirosh, Adjudicating Appearance: From Identity to Personhood, 19 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 49, 53–54 (2007) (arguing that appearance is part of the core aspects of personhood and thus
worthy of legal protection).
57
See Tirosh, supra note 25, at 273–74, 313 (explaining that the right to determine one’s body
size derives from rights to dignity and autonomy and that the state has tried to limit this right through
direct intervention).
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also a major factor in our social identity, in how others see us, and in how
we see and understand ourselves. This is indeed such a vulnerable and
sensitive area of existence that the government (and private actors) should
be extremely careful and hesitant when considering direct or indirect
interventions in managing people’s body size. Harm of this kind usually
does not accompany policies aimed at behaviors such as seat belt wearing
or marijuana smoking. A horizontal analysis of paternalism often misses
this difference.
Policies aimed against marijuana consumption can have markedly
different effects if applied to obesity prevention—even if they are
theoretically of the same degree of paternalism. We cannot conclude, for
example, that if the government employs a personal narrative strategy in a
marijuana-prevention campaign and this strategy is publicly accepted,
effective, and does not interfere with basic rights, then it is a desirable and
legitimate strategy for obesity-prevention policies. Therefore, a narrativebased campaign about John, whose marijuana smoking caused him to
move to stronger and more dangerous drugs or to suffer psychological
damage, is different in terms of the intrusion on autonomy and
infringement of dignity than a campaign based on the story of Jack, whose
extra pounds led to his diabetes or his layoff.
Although the campaigns about John and Jack employ a similar degree
of paternalism according to Friedman’s typology,58 the interference with
autonomy in these two cases is unequal, both in degree and in shape. One
difference is that fat people are continuously stigmatized and shamed and
are socially visible as belonging to the denounced group, whereas other
groups of people are not so easily identifiable. Therefore, a narrativebased campaign that presents fat people as ill, regretful, lacking selfcontrol, or lonely would double their stigmatization and further legitimize
discrimination against them.59 Moreover, such a campaign would
humiliate and disempower them, thereby having an adverse effect on their
dignity and their autonomy. While marijuana smokers are sometimes
ridiculed, they are not as stigmatized and despised as fat people.
Marijuana smoking does not raise strong moralistic sentiments like
obesity—a point on which I will elaborate. Additionally, while some
people and sub-cultures are attached to smoking marijuana, this habit is not
as integral to a person’s everyday life and sense of self as eating practices,
body size, and exercise habits. Food also occupies a different place in our
58
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1699 (defining “[s]trong-form debiasing” to include “‘truthful
narratives of harm’ in order to illustrate the downside effects of various biases”).
59
See Rebecca Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Bias, Discrimination, and Obesity, 9 OBESITY RES.
788, 800 (2001) (noting that being overweight is “severely stigmatized”). The depth and spheres of
weight-based discrimination exist in diverse contexts, including medical, education, and employment
settings. See generally id.
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lives and our culture, by comparison to light drugs. Foodways are much
richer, more diverse, and more related to culture, community, memory,
trust, and identity than rituals and practices around cannabis-smoking.
Finally, eating is essential to survival—no one can live without eating.
Marijuana is not indispensable, although some would say that it can be
extremely helpful for relieving pain or adding flavor to life.60
Friedman frames obesity as a disease and argues that the overall
financial impact of obesity justifies larger acceptance of stronger
paternalistic means.61 These stances merit more skepticism in light of the
normative considerations raised here. It is disappointing that this is his
conclusion, even though he recognizes that “the regulation of caloric intake
and expenditure stands to interfere with some deeply personal trade-offs
that individuals must make about their health, appearance, and instant
enjoyment of life.”62
Cultural beliefs and intuitions play a role here as well. Horizontal
surveys of paternalism miss the particular and contradictory “gut-feelings”
and deeply entrenched standpoints many people have about obesity,
fluoridation, or GMOs. Such gut-feelings may be inconsistent with
endorsing or rejecting paternalism because they are shaped by the
particular issue, not by principled positions on government intervention.
Widely held views about fat people, their place in culture, and how they
are represented in the media and in the medical discourse are deeper and
more extensive than approaches toward marijuana smokers.63 As Kathleen
LeBesco contends, in the discourse about obesity, “a new kind of
moralism” is at play, which legitimizes daily chiding of fat people “by
mere acquaintances and passers-by.”64 The constant framing of obesity as
60
See Cynthia S. Duncan, The Need for Change: An Economic Analysis of Marijuana Policy, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1701, 1707 (2009) (recognizing the growing support for marijuana use in the medical
community, as it provides therapeutic value for some medical conditions); Scott Clement, Marijuana
Legalization Support Hits Milestone, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2013, at A3 (noting that many people report
smoking marijuana “just for fun”). A similar point is made about the difference between regulating
tobacco smoking and regulating obesity. See Alberto Alemanno & Ignacio Carreño, “Fat Taxes” in
Europe: A Legal and Policy Analysis Under EU and WTO Law, 2 EUR. FOOD & FEED L. REV. 97, 100
(2013) (“[T]axation structures that worked for tobacco (i.e. an excise tax on a single substance that is
proven to be harmful) may not be automatically transferable to food, which is essential for life and as
such tends to involve more complex choices.”); Ignaas Devisch, Food Taxes: A New Holy Grail?, 1
INT’L J. HEALTH POL’Y & MGMT. 95, 96 (2013) (“[F]ood is not readily comparable with alcohol and
tobacco . . . .”).
61
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1714 (arguing that the external costs of obesity may justify
harder paternalism efforts).
62
Id. at 1727.
63
See, e.g., Kathleen LeBesco, Fat Panic and the New Morality, in AGAINST HEALTH: HOW
HEALTH BECAME THE NEW MORALITY 72, 72–73 (Jonathan M. Metzl & Anna Kirkland eds., 2010)
(discussing the widespread panic that popular rhetoric about obesity instills in people from various
sects of American society).
64
Id. at 72.
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an epidemic and the resonance of television shows such as The Biggest
Loser are indicative of a moral panic toward obesity.65
It is unsurprising, adds LeBesco, that the moral injunction is aimed
mainly “against those we imagine to be indolent and undisciplined,” such
as “women, the poor, and people of color.”66 Anti-obesity messages, in
other words, are a way of patronizing the poor and disempowered and
distinguishing the upper classes as superior in their judgment, self control,
and choices.67 Jonathan Metzl acknowledges that health, combined with a
focus on thinness, “is a concept, a norm, and a set of bodily practices
whose ideological work is often rendered invisible by the assumption that
it is a monolithic, universal good . . . [and] ideologically obfuscates the
ways in which the good health of some . . . promotes purely political
agendas under the guise of passion or concern.”68
Most of us, then, have strong “gut-feelings” about which bodies are
beautiful, healthy, and worthy of envy, and which bodies are degenerative,
inferior, and in urgent need of corrective transformation. Therefore, when
considering the data on the risks of obesity we should take into account
that this data is never purely scientific and objective, but rather inflated and
distorted to some degree by deeply entrenched moralistic biases toward
fat.69 And when considering anti-obesity measures, we must factor in the
65
See David Barboza, Can Kraft Trim the Fat in an Oreo World?, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2003, at
C1 (discussing obesity as an “epidemic”). Professor Richard Epstein warns that we should not frame
obesity as an epidemic because this legitimizes stronger paternalistic interventions that limit autonomy.
See Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) to Do About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO.
L.J. 1361, 1368 (2005) (explaining that framing obesity as a public health concern causes more harm
than good because it limits personal and individual responses to obesity).
66
LeBesco, supra note 63, at 75.
67
Friedman recognizes the social disparity of obesity across gender, ethnicity, genetics, and
socioeconomic status. Friedman, supra note 1, at 1716–17. But this does not lead him to doubt the
motivation of anti-obesity measures. For an elaboration on class biases in the obesity debate, see Katy
(Feb.
8,
Waldman,
Uncle
Sam
Is
Not
Coming
to
Dinner,
SLATE
2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/intelligence_squared/2012/02/obesity_is_not_
the_government_s_business_how_paul_campos_and_john_stossel_won_the_slate_intelligence_square
d_debate_on_feb_7_.html.
68
Jonathan M. Metzl, Introduction: Why Against Health?, in AGAINST HEALTH, supra note 63, at
1, 9. Richard Klein adds: “My concern is with the particular ways in which public health is used for
moral edification and as an instrument of social control with political implications for individual
freedom.” Richard Klein, What Is Health and How Do You Get It?, in AGAINST HEALTH, supra note
63, at 15, 17.
69
Many critics make this point. See PAUL CAMPOS, THE OBESITY MYTH: WHY AMERICA’S
OBSESSION WITH WEIGHT IS HAZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH 38−40 (2004) (explaining that anti-obesity
policies are motivated by myriad financial interests and other foreign considerations); MICHAEL GARD
& JAN WRIGHT, THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC: SCIENCE, MORALITY AND IDEOLOGY 105–06 (2005)
(proposing that viewing obesity as an epidemic is unwarranted by scientific findings, but shaped by
deeply entrenched bias against fat); GINA KOLATA, RETHINKING THIN: THE NEW SCIENCE OF WEIGHT
LOSS AND THE MYTHS AND REALITIES OF DIETING 197−98 (2008) (positing that science has not yet
succeeded in finding a way to make people lose weight for the long term, but that the recommendation
to lose weight persists because scientists, doctors, and the diet industry depend on this market);
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cost of denouncing and isolating fat people, as well as alienating them
from their bodies and from society.70
Another reason why these harms to autonomy often go unnoticed,
besides the moral panic toward being fat, is that we are culturally destitute
with respect to a vocabulary delineating somatic and sensory experience.
As I explained elsewhere,71 the dualism toward mind and body, which
shaped Western culture, renders it close to impossible to represent
embodied experience and convey and conceptualize the importance of this
experience.72
Humbleness and self-reflexivity about our motivations in regulating
eating, driving, or smoking, and about their effect on individual well-being,
are therefore immanent. The obesity regulation debate lacks such
humbleness and reflexivity, to a great extent because obesity is discussed
comparatively, alongside other public health issues that do not touch on
such fierce convictions and deeply held intuitions.73 This insight is true, of
course, for analyzing any other health policy issue. For example, the social
denouncement of people who consume GMOs is much softer than the
denouncement of tobacco smokers. Smoking and GMO-consumption are
also different in their location at the core or the periphery of dignity and
autonomy. Narrative strategies, shaming strategies, and mandates would
therefore work differently in each context.

ABIGAIL C. SAGUY, WHAT’S WRONG WITH FAT? 48−49 (2013) (postulating that efforts to reduce
obesity rates are nourished by a moral panic about fat).
70
For Friedman’s apt citation of Puhl and Heuer’s discussion of the harsh social injustice caused
by weight bias, see Friedman, supra note 1, at 1721 (quoting Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer,
The Stigma of Obesity: A Review and Update, 17 OBESITY 941, 941 (2009)).
71
See Tirosh, supra note 25, at 295−99 (arguing that the dualism of the body and the mind is a
main cause for the continuing lack of recognition of one’s body size as a significant basic right); see
also Yofi Tirosh, Weighty Speech: Addressing Body Size in the Classroom, 28 REV. EDUC., PEDAGOGY,
& CULTURAL STUD. 267, 274−75 (2006) (discussing the lack of vocabulary to talk about body size in a
way that does not reproduce medical or moralistic frameworks).
72
See Klein, supra note 68, at 23 (“In the historical debate between mind and matter, mind won
and silenced the voice of the body; it interpreted the body in terms of mind and considered it a mute
machine that only reason could discover. It is time to recover that corporeal voice, to recast the
Epicurean thinking that puts pleasure in the place of thought, that imagines bodily pleasure to be a kind
of thinking. Good health will then be understood as a consequence of good pleasure, and adult pleasure
will be prized, not tabooed, moderated not censored, indulged not feared.”); see also Donald Moss,
Obesity, Objectification, and Identity: The Encounter with the Body as an Object in Obesity, in THE
BODY IN MEDICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE, 43 PHIL. & MED. 179, 180 (Drew Leder ed., 1992) (using
phenomenology to develop accounts of the experience and meanings of living with a fat body).
73
Friedman recognizes the contradictory data on obesity prevention—data that suggest, for
example, that there is no direct correlation between reducing caloric consumption or increasing
physical activity and weight loss. Friedman, supra note 1, at 1715–16. Nevertheless, Friedman does
not conclude that this lack of clarity about the causes entails hesitation in encouraging individuals to eat
less and exercise more. Moreover, Friedman ignores the harmful effects of repeated failed attempts to
diet on one’s health, as well as to one’s attempts to lose weight. For more on this point, see Tirosh,
supra note 25, at 288–91.
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IV. IT’S THE STRUCTURE, STUPID!
Discussions of paternalism in public health often fail to grant enough
weight or consideration to structure—such as the prevailing or legal
framework, economic conditions, and technological developments. This is
natural, for it is much harder to change structure than to design a policy for
a narrowly-defined goal. Structure, moreover, is often invisible or selfevident; challenging it thus requires deeper intellectual investment and
imaginative power.
The valuable data presented in Friedman’s article illustrate that antiobesity policies place too much focus on changing individual behavior. In
the case of New York City’s soda size limitation, “the excessive
consumption [of sugary drinks] . . . was only engaged in by a small part of
the public,”74 so limiting drink volume would have only a marginal effect
on soft drink consumption and on consumer weight. Similarly, regulators
can only hope for negligible changes in food consumption by calorie-count
disclosure mandates.75 Friedman’s quotation of Loewenstein is worth
repeating here, as it poignantly expresses my current point:
Calorie labeling, in effect, puts the onus of weight reduction
on consumers, but consumers have not grown fat because
they have stopped paying attention to what they eat; they
have grown fat because processed food has become cheaper
(both in terms of money and time), whereas fresh food has
become more expensive. The most serious risk associated
with calorie labeling, therefore, is not its effect on consumers
themselves, which is likely to be minimal; the real danger is
that it will substitute for, or delay, more substantive policies
that get at the root cause of the problem.76
The uneven social distribution of obesity should also be educational in
this context. It is highly unconvincing to assume that urban people, people
of color, and people of low income have, at some point, begun to make
poor decisions about eating and physical activity77 and that this is why they
74

Friedman, supra note 1, at 1740.
See id. at 1731 (noting that early studies on New York City’s caloric disclosure law suggested
that it did not have a significant effect on consumers’ caloric consumption). But see id. (“However,
some data emerging from mandatory caloric disclosures support the notion that such programs may
prove mildly effective in some zones.”).
76
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1734 (quoting George Loewenstein, Confronting Reality: Pitfalls of
Calorie Posting, 93 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 679, 680 (2011)).
77
However, recent research indicates that the poor may be lacking the cognitive resources
required for making good decisions due to their many poverty-related concerns. See Anandi Mani et
al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCIENCE 976, 980 (2013) (“The poor . . . are less capable
not because of inherent traits, but because the very context of poverty imposes load and impedes
cognitive capacity.”). Indeed, more should be studied about these dynamics before deciding that the
75
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have become fatter than the rest of the population.
A. Background Conditions Matter

Let me elaborate on what I mean by saying that structural
considerations should play a more substantial role in the debate about
paternalism.
We should not treat dilemmas about paternalism as if they emerge
from empty space and operate outside of the existing social, economic, and
legal contexts. Any analysis of paternalism must take into account the
background conditions in which a paternalistic policy, if deployed, would
operate. Friedman uses the example of the lifeguard’s dilemma: A
lifeguard who “knows that broken glass has presented hazards on her
beach” wonders whether to warn, or even stop, beach-goers from walking
barefoot.79 What is overlooked, however, is the fact that the lifeguard will
have different considerations and conclusions depending on factors such as
the frequency of beach-cleaning by authorities, the availability of
emergency medical services in the event that someone is injured, and
whether she would be immunized from tort liability or from disciplinary
proceedings if the beach-goers indeed get hurt.
The same point should be made about obesity. In considering the
paternalism level of anti-obesity policies, we must account for the context
in which those policies operate. Perhaps caloric information in fast food
restaurants would not be needed if corn farming was not so heavily
subsidized and corn syrup made so cheap, boosting the caloric density and
shrinking the price of fast food.80 Perhaps, still, obesity would not have
been a problem for policymakers if neighborhoods were designed for
pedestrians and not for cars and if the labor structure enabled parents to
poor make irrational choices that make them fatter, since it is noteworthy that the study clarifies that
the findings “are not about poor people, but about any people who find themselves poor.” Id.
78
As a cautionary note, arguments that focus on structure often do not overcome the prejudice or
erroneous assumptions sometimes underlying paternalistic policies. Take, for instance, LeBesco’s
skepticism of arguments that focus on structure. LeBesco argues that structural arguments might
reinforce patronizing and victimizing fat people, as well as an approach that “may make the individual
less morally suspect, but . . . does nothing to dismantle the overarching and oppressive moral
framework of health.” LeBesco, supra note 63, at 77–78. In other words, LeBesco argues that
focusing on infrastructure issues, such as a lack of time and financial means to live healthily, does not
challenge underlying assumptions such as the axiomatic imperative to lose weight or the ingrained bias
against fat people. Still, there are other structural factors, with which I think LeBesco would agree, that
we should take into account. Consider, for example, background conditions about the legality of
weight-based discrimination. LeBesco also surely sides with the need to tone down the blame game
against fat individuals.
79
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1697.
80
See Scott Fields, The Fat of the Land: Do Agricultural Subsidies Foster Poor Health?, 112
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A820, A821−22 (2004) (noting that agricultural subsidies in general, and corn
subsidies in particular, are driving down the cost of fast food).
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have time to shop and prepare food at home for their families. Then again,
had the welfare system and the taxing scheme created more distributive
justice and lowered socio-economic gaps, more people could afford
healthful food and we would not witness urban “food deserts” where
consumers have no access to a fresh tomato or whole-wheat bread.81
As noted above, paternalistic policies against obesity are aimed at
shaping individual behavior (e.g., requiring indications of the caloric
values on menus so each consumer can make her own decision or
designing a campaign of diet success stories to encourage obese people to
diet). Focusing on such policies diverts attention and resources from
policies that aim to change the scenery of choices and the structure of the
food market. For example, such individually focused policies detract from
societal policies like subsidies and taxing schemes or urban planning
measures that are designed for pedestrians.82 Additionally, these policies
make us forget that structural changes may render paternalistic means
unnecessary.
B. Considering What Regulators Do Not Do
Discussions about paternalism, including Friedman’s analysis, often
focus on the things that the government does actively, while ignoring the
ways governments act by omission. Non-state-intervention is a form of
intervention. In the case of obesity, for example, we must consider not
only active policies such as taxing junk food or banning trans fat, but also
that it is currently not illegal to discriminate against employees or potential
employees based on weight, to strike down jurors because they are fat,83 or
to require double airfare from large passengers. These forms of nonintervention by the state send private actors and public institutions the
81
See USDA Defines Food Deserts, AM. NUTRITION ASS’N., http://americannutritionassociation.o
rg/newsletter/usda-defines-food-deserts (last visited Mar. 24, 2014) (defining “food deserts” as areas
that lack access to fresh fruits and vegetables). Food deserts are particularly common in impoverished
areas. Id.
82
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1717 (noting that “obesity rates vary widely by neighborhood”
and that they fluctuate in accordance with the availability of supermarkets, walking pavements, fitness
facilities, commercial land use, and area income).
83
See Maggie Elise O’Grady, A Jury of Your Skinny Peers: Weight-Based Peremptory
Challenges and the Culture of Fat Bias, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 47, 51, 53−55, 61 (2011) (surveying
and criticizing cases in which a juror’s weight passed muster as grounds for an attorney’s striking him
or her down through peremptory challenges). Weight-based bias also exists in criminal procedure.
See, e.g., Natasha A. Schvey et al., The Influence of a Defendant’s Body Weight on Perceptions of
Guilt, 37 INT’L. J. OBESITY 1275, 1279 (2013) (“The results of the present study indicate that body
weight and sex of a defendant have an interactive effect on juror perceptions of guilt and responsibility.
Importantly, obese female defendants were judged significantly more harshly than lean female
defendants among the male participants, whereas weight incurred no penalty for the male
defendants.”); see also Valena Elizabeth Beety, Criminality and Corpulence: Weight Bias in the
Courtroom, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 523, 524 (2013) (“Weight bias also prevails in the
courtroom . . . .”).
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message that it is okay to exclude, tax, and humiliate fat individuals.
Insofar as paternalism regulates to shape people’s behaviors and
preferences, failure to regulate is also an act of paternalism.
C. Complicating the Utility Calculus
Paternalistic policies may seem beneficial at first but counterproductive in hindsight. Indeed, Friedman recognizes the tricky nature of
such policies.84 He recognizes that paternalistic policies to prevent obesity
may be ineffective,85 but he fails to address key reasons for their
unsuccessfulness.
Friedman interchangeably uses utility in terms of financial public cost
and in terms of extending life expectancy.86 However, these considerations
are different and may call for distinct policies. More importantly, both
considerations are limited proxies for what public health should promote—
namely, quality of life. How much remains in the public budget is not a
sufficient proxy for the public’s welfare. Similarly, according to a utility
calculus the number of years lived must be analyzed alongside the quality
of life during those years. Fewer years of a life of dignity and less selfhatred may result in more happiness than more years of a life full of
repeated attempts to lose weight and ongoing feelings of bodily inferiority.
Even if we remain strictly within the utilitarian framework as
Friedman understands it, we may discover that obesity concerns are
inflated (as there are growing indications that some health measures
improve the heavier one is).87 We may also discover that common-sense
measures to prevent obesity may work in unexpected directions—and even
backfire.
Current assessments of anti-obesity policies should be wary of
common-sense assumptions that encouraging people to lose weight is
helpful, or at least can do no harm. Such encouragements, however, may
be not only a waste of money and energy, but they actually produce the
opposite outcome.88 This is so in light of the astonishing failure of

84
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1696, 1698–99, 1719 (noting the nuanced approach that
paternalistic policies require in regulating obesity).
85
See id. at 1711 (“It also appears that certain factors driving obesity rates may prove difficult for
regulators to change.”).
86
E.g., id. at 1714, 1721, 1753.
87
See, e.g., CAMPOS, supra note 69, at 41–54 (surveying research that shows that weight risks are
inflated); Katherine M. Flegal et al., Aim for a Healthy Weight: What Is the Target?, 131 J. NUTRITION
440S, 449S (2001) (“[W]eights outside the healthy weight range may be healthy and . . . weights inside
the healthy weight range may not be healthy.”).
88
See Angelina R. Sutin & Antonio Terracciano, Perceived Weight Discrimination and Obesity, 8
PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2013) (finding that people were more likely to become obese if they were subjected to
weight-based discrimination).
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scientists and doctors to find a way to maintain weight loss over time.89
Other inefficiencies should be factored in, such as the billions of dollars
invested in diet products and services; the inefficiency of the labor market,
which may miss apt job candidates due to weight bias; the inefficient
medical care provided to many fat people by biased doctors who focus on
weight; the lack of access to medical facilities that fit larger bodies; and
more.90
Moreover, shaming people about their body weight is more likely to
increase obesity rates, not decrease them. One recent study found that
overweight women who watched a video containing negative messages on
obesity consumed three times more snacks afterward than overweight
women who watched a neutral video.91 Another study found that, initial
weight notwithstanding, the chances of teenagers who diet to become
overweight are bigger than the chances of teenagers who do not diet.92 In
other words, even teenagers with no weight problem will gain weight due
to weight loss attempts.
An additional study found that participants responded to negative
remarks about their weight by refusing to go on a diet, rather than by
starting one.93 In Richard Klein’s words, “It appears that the epidemic of
dieting may actually be worse for our health than the obesity epidemic. . . .
The more we diet, the fatter we seem to become.”94
V. CONCLUSION
As a closing remark, I would like to make a point about the temporal
dimension of the paternalism debate. Paternalistic steps are often framed
89
For a discussion of research supporting the claim that weight is immutable, see Tirosh, supra
note 25, at 285−88.
90
Id. at 291−94.
91
Natasha A. Schvey et al., The Impact of Weight Stigma on Caloric Consumption, 19 OBESITY
1957, 1961 (2011).
92
Dianne Neumark-Sztainer et al., Dieting and Unhealthy Weight Control Behaviors During
Adolescence: Associations with 10-Year Changes in Body Mass Index, 50 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 80,
84 (2012).
93
See Rebecca M. Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Confronting and Coping with Weight Stigma: An
Investigation of Overweight and Obese Adults, 14 OBESITY 1802, 1807–10 (2006) (“[A] frequent
coping strategy reported by participants to deal with stigma was eating more food. Seventy-nine
percent of the total sample reported using this strategy more than once or multiple times, and only 10%
reported never using this strategy.”).
94
Klein, supra note 68, at 16. Klein points to another inefficiency in the message that obesity is
bad, saying, “Not only is health the sine qua non of pleasure (that without which there is none), but
pleasure improves your health. Put another way, if you inhibit the body’s pleasure, you provoke
disease.” Id. at 19; see also Anna Mollow, Sized up: Why Fat Is a Queer and Feminist Issue, BITCH
MAG., Summer 2013, at 17, 17, available at bitchmagazine.org/article/sized-up-fat-feminist-queerdisability (“The small differences in life expectancies between average-size and very large people are
most likely not caused by being fat but are instead the result of factors correlated with fatness: social
stigma, economic discrimination, and the harmful effects of weight-loss dieting and diet drugs.”).
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as helping people take their future preferences into account. These steps
are intended to encourage people to avoid giving themselves a big discount
for their current harmful behavior, a discount that would come at the
expense of their future self, who will be less suited for closing the
significant discount gap.96 Friedman refers to this instinct for instant
gratification as the “present bias” in the temporal valuations of behavior,97
which is suggested to create “internalities” that effect efficiency.98
However, there are contexts in which our understanding of the direction of
the temporal axis should be entirely reversed. As I argued elsewhere, this
is the case regarding obesity.99 Fat individuals often focus on a
transformative, post-diet future in which they will be thin and all their
problems in life will be solved. This causes them to deny the present.
Every diet that fails in the early evening becomes a reason to binge eat at
night. What matters is the life they imagine they will live after the diet
succeeds. Therefore, they often avoid taking ambitious steps in their
careers, opening themselves to intimate relationships, or going out to
public places where appearance is accentuated, such as the beach or a
dance club.100 It is not the present self that is damaging the future self; it is
the imagined and unrealistic future self that is oppressing the present self.
If the government wants to promote health, it needs to undo the
seemingly self-evident but erroneous link in public perception between

95
See GLEN WHITMAN, CATO INST., POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 563: AGAINST THE NEW
PATERNALISM: INTERNALITIES AND THE ECONOMICS OF SELF-CONTROL 11 (Feb. 2006) (suggesting
that a tax should be set equal to the future costs of eating [unhealthy food], so that the present self will
take exactly those costs into account”).
96
See id. at 2 (“Although your choice to eat Twinkies or smoke cigarettes or skip exercising today
doesn’t harm anyone else, it does harm your future self. If we think of a person as consisting of
multiple selves—the present self who wishes to indulge the transient pleasures versus the future self
who wishes to be healthy—then arguably the present self’s choices can force externalities on the future
self.”).
97
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1728–29. For further discussion of the regulatory response to this
temporal bias, see Saul Levmore, From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory
Intensity, Information Revelation, and Internalities, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 229 (2014).
98
See Levmore, supra note 97, at 234 (“[C]onsider the possibility that helmet laws (or contractual
requirements) are driven by internalities. A skier, for example, may recognize the safety value of a
helmet but decline to acquire one because it will look uncool. Perhaps it will signal a lack of daring, or
disrupt a desired après-ski hairstyle.”).
99
Tirosh, supra note 25, at 301–04 (“The discourse around fat people is, then, past-centered and
future-centered, while neglecting the present. It leaps from the paradise lost onto the idealized post-diet
transformation.”).
100
See Samantha Murray, (Un/Be)Coming Out? Rethinking Fat Politics, 15 SOC. SEMIOTICS 153,
155 (2005) (“One is waiting to become ‘thin’, to become ‘sexual’, waiting to become.”); Mandy Katz,
Tossing Out the Diet and Embracing the Fat, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at E3 (“For many dieters, ‘the
pursuit of thinness as a dream is a place holder,’ . . . . ‘It gets in the way of asking, What is it I am
dreaming of?’”).
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weight and health.
It should not encourage fat people to reject their
current bodies and focus on achieving svelte figures.
Friedman suggests defining obesity as a disease and using a more
concrete narrative to describe obesity’s effects on one’s health.102 I suggest
something different: fostering an environment that embraces diverse bodies
that come in every shape and size. We must build this environment by
implementing structural reforms aimed at reducing the cost of healthy
food, by providing opportunities for everyone to exercise and by
encouraging people to resist the anti-obesity atmosphere. We must
endorse what Kathleen LeBesco describes as “well-being without trotting
out the old canards that reinforce body prejudices and encourage eating
disorders and yo-yo dieting.”103
Similarly, marijuana users who are often beset by the assumption that
they will move on to harder drugs may lose faith in anti-marijuana public
health campaigns because they do not reflect their experience. Remedying
the “present bias” might then result in an unintended outcome, perhaps
even a complete reversal of the objective.
I would like to close this Article with a paragraph from Richard Klein,
whose rich writing on overeating, smoking, and other vices implores us to
imagine subjects who are not only healthy, but also happy—even if this
happiness is achieved through pleasurable behaviors that are suboptimal to
health:
In America, we have become strangely divorced from our
bodies, counting calories on every product in the
supermarket, watching blood pressure, measuring
cholesterol, and sacrificing pleasure for prurience. These
days, we do not eat for pleasure, but to lower our numbers.
Yet we are one of the fattest nations in the world and
growing every day more obese. But what do we stand to lose
if we lose the enjoyment and pleasure that we derive from
good eating and drinking? We may stand to lose everything.
The epidemiologist cannot tell us what the Epicurean wants
to know: What should I choose to love without guilt? What
is good for me? What keeps me happy? What, in the best
sense, keeps me healthy?104
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